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TOWARDS AN "HONEST BELIEF PLUS"
STANDARD IN CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
In employment discrimination actions, most courts currently
apply an "honest belief' standard to determine whether an employer
had a legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for its adverse
employment action, such as termination or refusal to hire. The
employer need only demonstrate that he or she "honestly believed"
that the employment action was based on factors other than
discrimination. Once the employer does so, the presumption of
discrimination following the plaintiffs showing of the prima facie
case drops out. Consequently, the employer is entitled to summary
judgment, notwithstanding the plaintiffs showing of its prima facie
case.
California has yet to adopt a preferred method for reviewing
such discrimination claims. However, this article argues that the
"honest belief' standard is unduly difficult for plaintiff-employees to
overcome. Instead, California courts should follow the "honest
belief plus" standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit in Smith v.
Chrysler Corp.1  That standard requires that an employer
demonstrate reasonable reliance on a particularized set of facts
leading to the adverse action.2 In other words, the employer cannot
rebut the prima facie discriminatory presumption simply by declaring
that he or she believed the employment action was based on
nondiscriminatory factors. The employer should be required to show
that the action followed a reasonable examination of business
considerations. With this changed standard, more employment
discrimination actions would survive summary judgment and
proceed to trial.
1. 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998).
2. Id. at 806.
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Part II of this Article presents the current legal framework for
deciding employment discrimination claims in California. Part III
describes the two competing visions regarding use of the "honest
belief' standard: the Sixth Circuit's "honest belief plus," and the
Seventh Circuit's "pure honest belief. ,3 Part IV argues that the
"honest belief plus" standard is the better approach because it would
maintain consistency with past U.S. Supreme Court decisions,
evidentiary requirements of summary judgment, and the goals of
anti-discrimination statutes. Finally, Part V observes that, although
California courts have yet to directly address the debate over the
"honest belief' standard, California has signaled its movement
towards "honest belief plus" in Green v State of California,4 which is
pending review by the California Supreme Court.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Several key statutes and the seminal case, McDonnell Douglas
v. Green,5 provide the framework for any employment discrimination
lawsuit brought in California.
A. Relevant Statutes
California plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination have
potential causes of action under both federal and state law.
Federal statutes provide protection against employment
discrimination in a variety of contexts. Disability discrimination
suits, for example, are governed by the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), which makes it unlawful to discriminate based on an
individual's disability.6  The ADA covers a wide range of
employment decisions, including job application procedures;
employee hiring, advancement, or discharge; compensation; job
training; and other terms or conditions of employment.7 The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) provides similar
3. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits are the two primary federal circuits that
have squarely addressed the "honest belief' standard within the context of
employment discrimination cases.
4. 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 254 (Ct. App. 2005)
5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).




protections against age-based discrimination. 8 Finally, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 covers discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
9
The equivalent California law is the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA), which prohibits discrimination due to race,
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental
disability, medical condition, marital status, sex, age, or sexual
orientation.10 FEHA also makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail
to take all reasonable steps necessary" to prevent discrimination from
occurring.' 1
B. Relevant Case Law-The McDonnell Douglas
Burden-Shifting Framework
The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the current framework for
adjudicating discrimination claims in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green.12 In that case, the employer laid off Green, an African
American, following a reduction in the company's work force.'
3
Believing that his discharge and McDonnell Douglas's general hiring
practices were racially-motivated, Green participated in a "stall-in,"
in which Green and others parked their cars in front of a McDonnell
Douglas plant during rush hour. 14 Police arrested Green and he
subsequently pled guilty to the charge of obstructing traffic.15
Nearly a year later, Green participated in a "lock-in," in which a
chain and padlock were placed on the front door of a McDonnell
Douglas building to prevent certain employees from leaving.' 6 Three
weeks after the "lock-in," Green responded to a McDonnell Douglas
advertisement for qualified mechanics. 17 The company decided not
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
10. Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)
(West 2005).
11. Id. § 12940(k).
12. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
13. Id. at 794.
14. Id. at 794-95.
15. Id. at 795.
16. Id. (noting that although Green knew of the planned lock-in, there was
no evidence that he participated in the event itself; he was not, after all,
arrested).
17. Id. at 796.
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to hire him, however, based on his participation in both the stall-in
and his association with the lock-in.' Green then brought suit under
Title VII, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation. 19
The McDonnell Douglas Court created a new three-part test for
a plaintiff-employee to survive summary judgment. First, the
employee initially carries the burden of establishing a prima facie
case for discrimination.2 0 The burden of production then shifts to the
employer to present evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory
motive for the adverse action.21 Finally, the employee then has the
burden to present evidence that the employer's stated non-
discriminatory motive is pretextual.2 z This approach is commonly
referred to as the "McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting"
framework. 3
1. Part 1-Employee's Burden to Establish Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case for discrimination, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that: (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2)
he was performing competently in the position he held; (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action (e.g., termination); and (4)
some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.
24
An employee can satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie
case, discriminatory motive, by showing that the employer replaced
him with somebody outside the protected class with equal or inferior
256qualifications. However, "failure to prove replacement.., is 'not
necessarily fatal' to [a] ... discrimination claim where the discharge
results from a general reduction in the work force due to business
conditions. 26  Rather, the employee can satisfy this element by
adducing circumstantial, statistical, or direct evidence that the
discharge occurred "under circumstances giving rise to"
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 802.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
620, 632 (Ct. App. 1996).
24. Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (Cal. 2000).




discrimination.27 Although the alleged basis for discrimination may
differ (e.g., race, age, or physical disability), the overall analytical
approach in determining whether there is discriminatory motive is
28the same.
Several California cases provide insight as to what does and
does not constitute sufficient evidence of a discriminatory motive. In
Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,29 the plaintiff, an African-
American employee of Lockheed Corporation brought suit under
FEHA alleging racial discrimination. 30 Specifically, Heard argued
that his new manager, Parisi, subjected him to racially-motivated
adverse employment actions (including those affecting travel
restrictions, his ranking within the company, and his merit wage
increase).3' In finding for the plaintiff, the court noted the following
evidence as supporting an inference of discrimination: Heard had
previously performed his job satisfactorily, and it was only after
Parisi became manager that Heard was subjected to the adverse
employment actions; Lockheed's own investigation concluded that
these actions were not justified; Heard and other employees believed
Parisi had engaged in racist conduct, and some of these employees
had previously complained about Parisi being racist; and that Parisi
stated that all minorities were low performers. 32 The court rejected
the contention that the plaintiff must prove that other similarly
situated non-African-American employees received the employment
terms and conditions that the employer denied the plaintiff.33 Rather,
the Court held that such a showing is only "one way of proving
intentional discrimination" and that, instead, the key determination is
whether "a particular individual was discriminated against and
why.
, 34
Likewise, the court found discriminatory motive in Mixon v.
27. Id.
28. See infra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
29. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620 (Ct. App. 1996).
30. Id. at 622.
31. Id. at 624.
32. Id. at 633-34.
33. Id. at 632.
34. Id. (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 156 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
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Fair Employment & Housing Commission.35  The plaintiff, an
African-American employee of the Hospital and Institutional
Workers' Union, alleged his termination was racially motivated.
36
Holding that the plaintiff established his prima facie case, the court
noted that despite the plaintiffs satisfactory work performance, he
was fired whereas white workers were not fired, and he was replaced
by a white worker with no more experience than he had.37
On the other hand, the court held there was no discriminatory
motive in Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co. 38  There, two former
employees of Wells Fargo, ages fifty-three and fifty-six, sued in
California federal court alleging age discrimination under ADEA and
FEHA. 39 The two plaintiffs were former vice presidents of Crocker
Bank who were terminated upon the merger of Crocker and Wells
Fargo. 40 After noting that the plaintiffs did not necessarily need to
show that they were replaced by younger employees to support an
inference of discriminatory motive, the Court held that "in a
reduction-in-force case, there is no adverse inference to be drawn
from an employee's discharge if his position and duties are
completely eliminated."' Rather, it maintained that the employee
had to show that his employer still had a continuing need for his
skills and services.42 The court subsequently held that the plaintiffs
did not demonstrate such a continuing need.43
In sum, the prima facie case of discrimination is relatively easy
to establish. To establish the fourth element, discriminatory motive,
the employee need only adduce some evidence tending to reveal a
discriminatory intent behind the employment action.
2. Part 2-Employer's Burden to Show Non-Discriminatory Motive
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case under the
35. 237 Cal. Rptr. 884 (Ct. App. 1987).
36. Id. at 885.
37. Id. at 892.
38. 902 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 1420, 1425.
40. Id. at 1419-20.
41. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Leichihman v. Pickwick Int'l & Am.
Can Co., 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir. 1987)).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 1422.
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McDonnell Douglas framework, a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination arises. 4 At this point, the burden of production shifts
to the employer to present evidence that the adverse action was based
on nondiscriminatory factors.45
Case law demonstrates that an employer can satisfy this
requirement by presenting credible evidence of non-discriminatory
motive. Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.46 provides an illustration. In
Guz, the plaintiff alleged age discrimination after being laid off from
his position as a financial reports supervisor for a firm that provided
engineering, construction and environmental remediation services.
47
The California Supreme Court held that the defendant made an
adequate showing that the plaintiffs termination was not motivated
by discrimination, but rather by business decisions following the
elimination of the plaintiffs work unit.48  The court considered
relevant testimony from a BNI executive that transferring the
plaintiffs unit's work to another part of the company would benefit
the company. Furthermore, the court referenced testimony from
another manager explaining why the company offered other
employees, and not the plaintiff, these newly-created positions.49
The manager's testimony included the observations that other
employees were "veterans" with whom he had "direct experience
with their backgrounds, skills, performance levels, and work
habits" 5 0 and that he was not even aware the plaintiff was available
for one of the positions.
51
Similarly, in Rose, the court noted that even if the plaintiff had
been able to establish the prima facie case, the general reduction in
work force due to job elimination and business necessity constituted
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiffs discharge.
44. See, e.g., Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1114 (Cal. 2000).
45. See, e.g., Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield W., Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459,
465 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973)).
46. 8 P.3d 1089 (2000).
47. Id. at 1094-95.
48. Id. at 1112.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1116.
52. 902 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990).
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On the other hand, in Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical
Center,53 the court found the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons for its hiring decisions to be insufficient to warrant summary
judgment.54 A registered nurse of Mexican descent sued a hospital
under FEHA after being turned down for a nursing position for
which she was allegedly qualified. After finding that the plaintiff
proved her prima facie case,56 the court held that the employer did
not present adequate evidence that the plaintiff was underqualified
for the position she sought. 57 Specifically, the court emphasized the
broad, general nature of the hiring manager's declaration that Sada's
work experience "did not 'come close"' to the experience of the
individuals who were hired.58 Moreover, the court concluded that
the "general and sometimes conclusory nature of [the hiring
manager's] description of the applicants who were hired" was
insufficient to show these applicants were more qualified than
Sada.59
Thus, these cases establish that an employer can satisfy the
second part of the McDonnell Douglas test by presenting credible
evidence that discrimination did not motivate its employment action.
3. Part 3-Employee's Burden to Show Pretext
If the employer satisfies the second step, "the burden shifts back
to the employee to meet his ultimate obligation of proving that the
reason for the adverse action was.., discrimination. California
courts disagree to some extent as to the precise showing required by
a plaintiff to meet this burden.61 However, the predominant view is
that an employee must show that the employer's stated
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action was false or
53. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (Ct. App. 1997).
54. Id. at 122.
55. Id. at 115.
56. Id. at 120-21.
57. Id. at 122.
58. Id. at 121.
59. See id.
60. Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield W., Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459, 465 (Ct.




"HONEST BELIEF PL US"
pretextual, and/or that the employer acted with a discriminatory
animus, such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the
employer engaged in intentional discrimination. 62
In Horn v. Cushman & Wakefield Western, Inc.,63 the Court
upheld summary judgment in a wrongful termination suit brought by
a fifty-nine year old former regional communications manager of a
commercial real estate company.64 Cushman & Wakefield Western
("C & W") laid off Horn following the restructuring of his position
to focus on external, rather than internal, communications. 65 C & W
eventually replaced Horn with thirty-eight year old Marsh, who had
more experience in sales and marketing than Horn.66
Although both parties conceded that Horn had established the
prima facie case, C & W produced evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating their employee. 67 Namely,
C & W restructured the position and the hiring manager believed that
Horn was not the best fit for the restructured position. 68 In arguing
that the stated nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual, Horn
contended that his job was not restructured and that C & W gave
inconsistent reasons for terminating him.
69
After considering the reasonableness of these arguments in light
of the evidence, the court held that Horn had presented insufficient
evidence of pretext.70 Specifically, the court noted that the duties
62. Id. (citing Hersant, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487-89; Martin v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 190 (Ct. App. 1994)). If an
employee has direct evidence that the employer based the adverse action at
least in part on discriminatory motives, he can pursue a "mixed motives"
theory. Under such a theory, "both legitimate and illegitimate factors
contribute to the employment decision." Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space
Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 627 (Ct. App. 1996). Typically, however, the
availability of such direct evidence is uncommon. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985). The plaintiff, therefore, will usually rely on
circumstantial or statistical evidence to prove discriminatory motive.
63. 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 459 (Ct. App. 1999).
64. Id. at 464.
65. See id. at 467.
66. Id. at 464.
67. See id. at 466.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 468.
70. Id.
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initially performed under Horn's position had changed significantly,
and that Horn was unable to show that C & W gave "ever-changing"
reasons for terminating him. 71 Notably, the court found it irrelevant
whether the employer's decision was "wrong, mistaken, or
unwise. ' '72  Rather, the employee needed to demonstrate "such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions" in the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory
reasons that a reasonable factfinder could have found them unworthy
of credence.
73
Conversely, the court found adequate evidence of pretext in
Sada v. Robert F. Kennedy Medical Center.74 The court determined
the hiring manager's remarks suggested a discriminatory motive in
her decision not to hire the plaintiff.75 For example, the court noted
the manager's comment that "Hispanics spend 20 to 30 years in this
country and do not bother to learn English, but they sure can find
those public offices where they can get food stamps and all kinds of
public assistance."
76
In sum, the McDonnell Douglas framework gives both the
employee and employer an opportunity to present evidence
supporting or refuting the existence of discriminatory intent. The
employee carries the initial burden of satisfying the prima facie case
for discrimination. The employer then has an opportunity to refute
the employee's claim by offering evidence of nondiscriminatory
motive. If the claim is refuted, the employee is then allowed to
challenge the legitimacy of this evidence. 77 Otherwise, the court can
dismiss the claim by summary judgment.
III. SPLIT OVER USE OF THE "HONEST BELIEF" STANDARD
Although the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework
provides a useful starting point for evaluating discrimination claims,
courts are divided over the exact showing required by the employer
71. Id. at 469-70.
72. Id. at 465.
73. Id. (citing Hersant v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 487
(Ct. App. 1997)).
74. 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (Ct. App. 1997).
75. Id. at 122.
76. Id. at 116.
77. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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when it asserts a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
action under the second and third steps.78 In particular, the Seventh
Circuit follows an "honest belief' rule (referred to here as the "pure
honest belief' standard) that "shields an employer from pretext-based
liability" upon a showing that the employer "honestly believed" in
the asserted nondiscriminatory basis for the discriminatory action.79
Under this approach, the employee may not question the
reasonableness of the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason.
Rather, the employee must focus their discrimination suit on direct
evidence that points to discriminatory motive, or evidence that
indicates their employer's belief in its legitimate reason for taking
action was not honest.
80
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit applies an "honest belief plus"
standard in which the employee can put forth evidence showing the
employer's asserted non-discriminatory justification was
unreasonable. 81  Under this approach, the employer must have
reasonably relied upon particularized facts" in making its adverse
employment decision.
A. "Pure Honest Belief" Standard
Several circuits currently apply the "pure honest belief'
standard, with the Seventh Circuit as perhaps its most ardent
advocate.83 That court first articulated the "pure honest belief'
standard in McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. 84 The
defendant, WGN television, demoted McCoy from "Director of
Creative Services" to "Director of Promotions and Publicity.
85
Soon thereafter, WGN terminated McCoy, who was then in his mid-
forties, and replaced him with a younger employee.86 Believing his
demotion and termination to be age-based, McCoy filed a lawsuit
78. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
79. Rebecca Michaels, Legitimate Reasons for Firing: Must They Honestly
Be Reasonable?, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2643, 2657 (2003).
80. Id. at 2658.
81. Id. at 2658.
82. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998).
83. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
84. 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 369-70.
86. Id.
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under ADEA.87 At the summary judgment phase, McCoy presented
evidence showing that WGN's asserted reasons for firing McCoy,
while premised on performance and budget-related concerns, were
implausible. 88 With respect to WGN's claim that his demotion and
termination were performance-related, the court held that "[even] if
the performance concern was a complete mistake, even if McCoy
was the best possible person for the job, so long as WGN honestly
believed he was not, its business judgment will not be second-
guessed by federal courts applying the ADEA."
89
In Kariotis v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., the
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to the "honest belief'
approach. 90 The defendant corporation terminated Kariotis from her
position as an executive assistant after the company asserted she had
fraudulently accepted disability benefits following her knee
replacement surgery. 91 Kariotis filed suit under the ADA, ADEA,
and several other federal statutes.92 In response, Navistar filed a
motion for summary judgment, invoking the "honest belief'
standard. 93 In ruling for the defendant, the court held that although
"[o]bjectively speaking, [Navistar's] investigation left something to
be desired,, 94 the
opportunity for rebuttal [of the employer's non-
87. Id.
88. Specifically, he argued that: (1) he performed well; (2) WGN never
asserted poor performance in the state administrative proceedings; (3) that
WGN ultimately hired a more expensive employee to replace him; and (4) the
decision to eliminate his final job came so quickly after his transfer that it is
implausible to suggest WGN wanted to give him a chance there. Id. at 373.
89. Id.
90. 131 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
91. Id. at 674.
92. Id. Kariotis also filed claims under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, the
Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Illinois Health Insurance Claim Filing
Act. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 675 (noting that Navistar did not approach Kariotis or her doctor,
but instead hired investigators to videotape her off-duty movements, who were
not medical experts). The court also acknowledged a letter sent by Kariotis'
physician to a Navistar manager, in which he vehemently objected to the
charge of disability fraud given Kariotis' physical condition. Id. at 675.
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discriminatory rationale] is not an invitation to criticize the
employer's evaluation process or simply to question its
conclusion about the quality of an employee's performance.
Rather,... arguing about the accuracy of the employer's
assessment is a distraction . . . because the question is not
whether the employer's reasons for a decision are "right but
whether the employer's description of its reasons is
honest.
95
Thus, Kariotis reflects the Seventh Circuit's refusal to entertain
questions of the reasonableness of the employer's actions, even when
these actions are arguably "irrational. 96
B. "Honest Belief Plus" Standard
Under the "honest belief plus" approach, the Sixth Circuit
allows plaintiff-employees to question the reasonableness of the
employer's actions. The Sixth Circuit first enunciated the "honest
belief plus" standard in Smith v. Chrysler Corp.9 7 The defendant,
Chrysler Corporation, terminated Smith from his job as an electrician
for failing to disclose a narcoleptic-like sleeping disorder on his
medical history forms. 98 In response to a recurrence of Smith's
narcoleptic episodes, Smith's physician wrote a letter to Chrysler
requesting that Smith be switched from the night shift to the day shift
due to a medical condition related to a sleep/wake disorder.99 In
response, the company's physician-relying on letters from
physicians, his own medical notes, and a telephone phone
conversation with Smith's physician-informed Chrysler that Smith
suffered from narcolepsy. Chrysler subsequently fired Smith for
lying on his employment form and driver's license application. 100
95. Id. at 677.
96. Michaels, supra note 79, at 2661.
97. 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998).
98. Id. at 801. On a medical history form, Smith checked "no" to the
question, "Have you ever had or have you now unusual tiredness or fatigue?"
Id. at 802. In addition, after approximately eight months on the job, Smith was
told to obtain a driver's license enabling him to operate the company's electric
carts. To obtain the license, Smith had to complete a form, on which he
checked "no" to the question, "Have you ever had narcolepsy?" Id. at 802-03.
99. Id. at 803.
100. Id. at 804.
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Smith contended that, although his condition was similar to
narcolepsy, it was not in fact narcolepsy. Smith then filed suit
alleging that Chrysler's employment decision violated the ADA and
a similar Michigan statute.'
0'
The Sixth Circuit expressly rejected the Seventh Circuit's "pure
honest belief' standard. 0 2 That standard, according to the Sixth
Circuit, is "at odds with the underlying purpose behind the [ADA]-
i.e., that employment actions.., be grounded on fact and not 'on
unfounded fear, prejudice, ignorance, or mythologies'."'10 3 Instead,
the court explained that for an employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason to be considered honestly held, the
employer must demonstrate "reasonable reliance on the
particularized facts that were before it at the time the [employment]
decision was made."' 4 The court went on to qualify the "reasonable
reliance" test by noting that "the decisional process used by the
employer [need not] be optimal or... [leave] no stone unturned.
Rather, the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably
informed and considered decision before taking an adverse
employment action."
' 0 5
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court found
that Chrysler had reasonably relied on the particularized facts when it
determined that Smith had falsely claimed he was not narcoleptic on
his driver's license application. °6  However, the court held that
Chrysler was unreasonable in its belief that Smith lied on the part of
his medical history form where he stated that he did not suffer from
tiredness and fatigue. 0 7  The court noted that "tiredness and
fatigue... do not even remotely cover the situation experienced by
narcoleptics."' 0 8  More importantly, Chrysler never attempted to
101. See id.
102. See id. at 806.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 807.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 808. The court noted that Chrysler based its decision on the
medically-informed opinions of Smith's physician, based on first-hand
information provided by Smith himself. Id. Given the "amount and the source
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adequately investigate whether there was such a link.10 9 Instead,
Chrysler relied on an "incorrect, stereotyped assumption that all
narcoleptics suffer from unusual fatigue," rather than on
particularized facts resulting from its investigation.' 10 However, the
court held that this failure to rely on particularized facts was
harmless, since Chrysler's other reasons for the termination were
satisfactory. 1 1
The Sixth Circuit reiterated the "honest belief plus" approach in
Joostberns v. United Parcels Service, Inc. 112 In that case, Joostberns
brought suit under the ADA, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and
Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act after being
fired from his position as truck driver. 113  Acting on a tip that
Joostberns shipped packages without paying for them, an
investigator at United Parcels Service ("UPS") looked at tracking
information in the UPS system, which revealed that there was no
record of payment for six packages shipped to Wisconsin.'1 14 When
the investigator confronted Joostberns about the matter, he admitted
that he recognized the address to which the packages had been
shipped as that of his daughter."15  Joostberns was subsequently
terminated. " 16
In finding for UPS, the court noted that Joostberns had no
payment record for the six shipments in question, and was unable to
give a reasonable explanation for the missing receipts.
1 7
Consequently, the court held that UPS had adequately relied on
particularized facts that were before it at the time it terminated
Joostbems. 1 "
8
Unlike Smith and Joostberns, in which the Sixth Circuit ruled
against the plaintiffs," l 9 in Archer v. Mesaba Aviation, Inc., 2 ° the
109. See id. at 808-09.
110. Id. at 809.
111. Id.
112. No. 04-2370, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 533 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2006).
113. Id. at *4.
114. Id. at *4-*5.
115. Id. at *5.
116. Id. at *6.
117. Id. at *29.
118. Id.
119. See supra notes 97 and 112 and accompanying text.
120. No. 98-2434, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6420 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2000).
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Sixth Circuit found the defendant could not overcome the heightened
scrutiny under "honest belief plus. ' 121 Archer brought suit against
Mesaba under the ADA, alleging the company terminated him from
his position as a customer service supervisor because he was HIV-
positive. 122 Mesaba claimed it fired Archer because he allegedly
engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct while riding as a non-
revenue passenger on a Mesaba flight.
123
Applying the "honest belief plus' 24 standard, the court held that
"[w]hile an employer is not required to turn over every stone, we do
not believe that Mesaba demonstrated its reasonable reliance on
particularized facts."'125  Specifically, the court noted that Mesaba
terminated Archer despite conflicting accounts of the alleged
incident. 126 In addition, Archer was never given an opportunity to
refute the allegations. 127  Noting that "[s]ignificantly, credibility
judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited during the
consideration of a motion for summary judgment,"'128 the court
reversed the defendant's summary judgment award.1
29
Thus, these Sixth Circuit cases demonstrate that while the
"honest belief plus" standard does "have teeth" in terms of affecting
the outcome of a defendant's summary judgment motion,1 30 it does
121. See id. at *18- 19.
122. Id. at *2-*3.
123. Id. at*14.
124. While the court states it is applying the "honest belief'
rule, in effect, it utilizes "honest belief plus." See id. at * 17-* 19.
125. Id. at* 19.
126. Id. at * 18-* 19. These accounts consisted of conflicting statements by
the flight attendant, captain, and first officer regarding whether anyone actually
witnessed the alleged acts take place.
127. Id. Under a "pure honest belief' standard, the outcome likely would
have been different, since Mesaba would only have had to demonstrate that it
"honestly believed" that the events in question actually transpired. See
Michaels, supra note 79, at 2667.
128. Archer, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6420, at *11.
129. See id. at* 19.
130. Michaels, supra note 79, at 2666. See also Dana Atchley, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: You Can't Honestly Believe That, 25 J. LEGIS.
229, 235 (1999) ("The difference [between 'honest belief and 'honest belief
plus'] is not one of theoretical niceties ... depending on which standard a
court chooses to measure a plaintiffs evidence, that plaintiff may lose on a
motion for summary judgment without ever having a fact-finder weigh the
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not preclude the success of all summary judgment motions. Rather,
the standard merely requires that the employer conduct a reasonable
investigation prior to taking an adverse employment action. If the
employer conducts a reasonable investigation, the court will
presumably grant summary judgment.
IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR ADOPTING "HONEST BELIEF PLUS"
For several reasons, California should follow the Sixth Circuit's
lead in adopting the "honest belief plus" standard. First, such a
system would be fairer to plaintiff-employees by eliminating the
virtually impossible burden of disproving an employer's claims of
"honest belief." Second, the standard is more consistent with past
Supreme Court decisions, in particular, United States Postal Service
v. Aikens 131 and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks 132-both of which
support a standard that allows examination of the true motivations
behind a defendant's employment action. Third, the "honest belief
plus" standard is more consistent with the standard of decision on
summary judgment. Namely, since the actual honesty behind the
employer's asserted "honest belief' is a question of fact, the
factfinder should evaluate the credibility of an employer's proffered
nondiscriminatory reason. Finally, the "honest belief plus" approach
supports the legislative goals behind both the federal and California
antidiscrimination laws.
A. Fairness to Plaintiff-Employees
From the perspective of a plaintiff trying to avoid summary
judgment in an employment discrimination suit, there is perhaps no
more daunting a task than trying to "prove" that an employer did not
honestly believe in its proffered non-discriminatory reason. As
Professor Anne Lawton observes, "[the] 'honest belief' standard has
made it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to prevail on an
employer's motion for summary judgment absent direct evidence of
the employer's discriminatory intent." 133 This is because, at bottom,
issues of credibility so crucial to the finding of intent.").
131. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
132. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
133. Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal
Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 646 (2000).
December 2006] 1385
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1369
the "pure honest belief' approach requires an employee to prove the
employer's state of mind.
Hughes v. Koppers Industries, Inc. 134 illustrates this point.
Hughes, an African American, sued Koppers Industries for failing to
promote him to laboratory supervisor at Koppers' chemical plant.
35
Koppers instead chose Traczek, a white man, for the position.
136
Hughes was clearly more qualified than Traczek: he had nineteen
years of experience in the industry and over five years with Koppers,
whereas Traczek had no industry experience prior to his four years at
Koppers; 137 Hughes had trained co-workers, including Traczek;
138
and Hughes had performed all of the functions of supervisor,
whereas Traczek had been on the "swing shift" and had not
performed many such functions. 39 Hughes' one alleged
"deficiency" was that he lacked a college degree, which was
ostensibly Koppers' basis for selecting Traczek. 140 Nevertheless, the
court held that "the issue is not whether Hughes was more qualified
than Traczek, but whether the employer could not have honestly
believed that Hughes was less qualified than Traczek ... Hughes
does not provide any citations to the record to cast doubt on [his
manager's] beliefs about Hughes' deficiencies."'' 14  Thus, to survive
summary judgment, Hughes was charged with the impossible task of
proving "the authenticity of the employer's belief," 42-i.e., proving
the employer's state of mind.1
43
The problem is particularly acute in lawsuits alleging
discriminatory hiring. As Professor Lawton notes,
[h]ow does a plaintiff in a circumstantial evidence case ever
prove that the employer did not honestly believe its reasons
for hiring another candidate? The standard is even more
134. No. 96-2625, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 223 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 1997),
discussed in Lawton, supra note 133, at 648.
135. Id. at *2-*3.




140. Id. at *6-*8.
141. Id.
142. Lawton, supra note 133, at 649.
143. Id. at 650.
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problematic when applied to subjective hiring criteria. For
example, how does a plaintiff demonstrate that her
employer did not honestly believe the candidate had
superior interpersonal skills? ... By forcing plaintiffs to
provide such evidence at the summary judgment stage, the
federal courts employing the 'honest belief standard
effectively ensure that few employment discrimination
plaintiffs will ever have their day in court.
14 4
The effect is to preclude potentially valid claims of discriminatory
hiring at the summary judgment phase, never giving the plaintiff a
chance to present his case before a jury.
The "honest belief plus" approach would mitigate this problem
by requiring the employer to present at least some particularized
facts upon which it based its decision. For example, in Hughes,
145
the employer would have needed to present specific deficiencies in
Hughes' qualifications that led the company to select the otherwise
less-qualified Traczek for promotion. Thus, rather than imposing an
impossible evidentiary burden upon the employee to prove the
employer's state of mind, under the "honest belief plus" standard the
employer would bear some responsibility for justifying its own
actions.
B. Consistency with Supreme Court Precedent
By adopting "honest belief plus," California courts would also
align themselves with two important U.S. Supreme Court
employment decisions, United States Postal Service v. Aikens 146 and
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.14 7 These cases follow from the
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas,148 and they both support
"honest belief plus." 1
49
In Aikens, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's
requirement that the plaintiff in a Title VII case present direct
144. Id. at 650-51.
145. See supra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
146. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
147. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
148. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a more in-depth discussion of the Court's
decision in McDonnell Douglas, see supra text accompanying notes 12-23.
149. For a detailed discussion of how these cases support "honest belief
plus," see Atchley, supra note 130, at § IV.B.
December 2006] 1387
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1369
evidence of discriminatory intent in order to make a prima facie
showing. 150 Rather, the plaintiff could defeat a summary judgment
motion either by providing direct evidence that the employer was
motivated by discrimination, or indirectly by challenging the
credibility of the employer's proffered explanation.' 5' Ultimately,
the court "must decide which party's explanation of the employer's
motivation it believes."'
152
The "pure honest belief' standard renders this "decision"
meaningless, however, since there is no basis to evaluate the
credibility of the employer's proffered explanation. An employer
will always claim that nondiscriminatory reasons motivated its
employment decision. However, under the "pure honest belief'
standard, neither the employee nor the court is "invit[ed] to criticize
the employer's evaluation process or ... question its conclusion
about the quality of an employee's performance."' 153 Given these
constraints, the employee effectively has no ammunition with which
to contest the employer's proffered reason.
In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff is not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on a showing of pretext alone under
the third step of the McDonnell Douglas test. 54  However, the
plaintiff still has an opportunity to cast doubt on the defendant's
proffered reason:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the
defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of
the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact
of intentional discrimination ... no additional proof of
discrimination is required. 1
55
Thus, the opinion in Hicks supports an evidentiary requirement that
allows meaningful exploration into the defendant's true motivations.
Absent a standard that allows for attacking the reasonableness of the
150. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 717.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
154. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
155. Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).
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employer's explanation, it is difficult to imagine how an employee
can possibly convince a factfinder to "disbelieve" the employer's
proffered reason.
C. Consistency with the
Evidentiary Requirements of Summary Judgment
A key rationale behind the Seventh Circuit's decision in McCoy
establishing the "pure honest belief' standard is that the credibility of
an employer's proffered reason is a question of fact that should be
reserved for the fact finder.' 56  As the court noted, "[s]ummary
judgment is only appropriate when the record reveals that no
reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party... [T]his
general standard is applied with added rigor in employment
discrimination cases, where intent is inevitably the central issue."
157
Under the "pure honest belief' approach, however, a defendant
can obtain summary judgment even in the face of a legitimate factual
dispute. For example, in Kariotis, the court issued summary
judgment for the defendant, Navistar, even though the plaintiff had
raised serious doubts as to Navistar's true motivations for her
termination. 158  In so doing, the Seventh Circuit "raises the
evidentiary barrier higher than necessary," resulting in the dismissal
of cases that would ordinarily proceed to trial in any other context. 1
59
D. Consistency with Federal and State Antidiscrimination Laws
The "honest belief plus" standard is consistent with one of the
primary legislative goals underlying federal antidiscrimination laws:
to prevent employment decisions based on unfounded stereotypes.
156. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
157. McCoy v. WGN Cont'l Broad. Co., 957 F.2d 368, 370-71 (7th Cir.
1992).
158. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. See also William R.
Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, the Rise of "Pretext Plus, " and the
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to
Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305,
347 (1996) ("Struggling with Hicks's evidentiary requirements for plaintiffs
attempting to satisfy their burden at the third stage, some lower courts not only
have taken the sword from plaintiffs, but also have allowed defendant
employers to brandish the swords of summary judgment and judgment as a
matter of law more freely.").
159. Atchley, supra note 130 at 235.
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ADA is designed to prevent people with disabilities from "be[ing]
discriminated against based on unfounded fear, prejudice, ignorance,
or mythologies."'' 60 Likewise, the ADEA is intended to avoid similar
stereotyping based on age.161 As one member of Congress debating
the bill authorizing ADEA noted, "[w]e must provide meaningful
opportunities for employment to the thousands of workers... who
are well qualified but nevertheless denied jobs which they may
desperately need because someone has arbitrarily decided that they
are too old.'
62
As Dana Atchley observes in writing about ADA, the "honest
belief plus" approach is more consistent with this goal of avoiding
stereotyping than is the "pure honest belief' standard:
The Sixth Circuit's approach to the "honest belief' rule is
more consistent with [ADA] than ... the Seventh Circuit.
By requiring that a defendant be able to point to particular
facts on which it reasonably relied when making its
decision, the Sixth Circuit in effect prohibits the defendant
from making such decisions recklessly (or negligently)...
The Seventh Circuit's approach, because it allows a
defendant to avoid liability so long as it 'honestly believes'
unfounded stereotypes about disabled people, is not
consistent with the ADA.
163
In other words, the "honest belief plus" standard ensures that
employers do their research before blindly making assumptions
regarding how an employee's age, sex, race or disability might affect
his or her work abilities.
160. See id. at 237 (citing 136 Cong. Rec. S 7422-03, 7437-7438 (daily ed.
June 6 1990)(statement of Sen. Harkin during debate over Chapman
Amendment to the ADA)).
161. See General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 588
(2004) (noting that the Congressional testimony at the ADEA hearings
"dwelled on unjustified assumptions about the effect of age on ability to
work").
162. Id. (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the
General Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1967) (testimony of representative Claude Pepper)).
163. Atchley, supra note 130, at 237-38.
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E. Arguments in Favor of the
"Pure Honest Belief" Standard are Unconvincing
Advocates of the "pure honest belief' standard raise several
arguments, none of which justify adopting this standard. First, they
claim that a "reasonableness" requirement would be too intrusive on
an employer's rights to make business judgments.' 64  One "pure
honest belief' supporter writes, "[a]llowing court inquiry into the
process that was used by an employer and allowing that process to be
subject to a reasonableness test imposes the court's judgment on how
the employer should run its business and manage its employees.",
' 65
However, this argument misinterprets what the "honest belief
plus" standard actually requires. The "honest belief plus" standard
does not require that employers make sound business decisions, but
rather that they make informed decisions. For example, suppose
Navistar, the employer in Kariotis,166 hadfirst conducted a thorough
investigation and subsequently reached the conclusion that Kariotis
had fraudulently accepted disability benefits. This fact alone would
satisfy the "honest belief plus" standard, since Navistar would have
based its decisions on a particularized set of facts. The court would
not inquire into whether Navistar's decision was sound from a
business perspective (e.g., by considering whether Kariotis' valuable
contribution to the company justified retaining her). Thus, the notion
that "honest belief plus" would require courts to interfere with
business judgments is ill-founded, since these judgments are
unrelated to the "honest belief plus" inquiry.
Advocates of the "pure honest belief' standard also argue that
this approach is consistent with the burdens set forth in McDonnell
Douglas. Specifically, they argue that, despite the "burden-shifting"
framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas, the burden "never
fully shifts to the employer" because the ultimate burden of
persuasion rests with the plaintiff.167 Therefore, "allowing a claim to
survive summary judgment just because the employer's reason might
not have been reasonable in the eyes of the court does not hold an
164. See Michaels, supra note 79, at 2672-74.
165. Id. at 2673.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96.
167. Michaels, supra note 79, at 2668.
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employee to the burden of persuasion."' 68 However, as discussed
above, the legitimacy of an employer's "honest belief' is a question
of fact that should be decided by fact-finders, not a judge during
summary judgment proceedings.' 69  Moreover, the fact that the
plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion does not mean that this
burden should be unreasonably difficult, like requiring an employee
to prove the employer's subjective state of mind.
Finally, advocates of "pure honest belief' argue that this
approach furthers judicial economy by ridding the docket of
meritless cases. 170  However, this standard sweeps too far by
eliminating legitimate cases in which plaintiffs are unable to
disprove the employer's proffered "honest belief." Thus, while
judicial economy is a worthwhile goal, it ought not come at the
expense of denying judicial relief to plaintiffs who are otherwise
entitled to recovery.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF GREEN V STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ON THE "HONEST BELIEF PLUS" STANDARD IN CALIFORNIA
Although California courts have yet to directly address the
debate over the "honest belief' standard, California has signaled its
movement towards "honest belief plus" with the pending case Green
v. State of California.17 1 Green was placed on disability retirement
after twelve years as a stationary engineer for a California
correctional facility.172  Green suffered from back problems and
Hepatitis C, the latter requiring medication resulting in fatigue and
other side effects. 173 As a result of these conditions, the company
placed Green on light duty assignment in June of 1997, followed by
temporary disability leave. 174 In June of 2000, he returned to work
with a letter from his back doctor clearing him for full duty.
75
However, after reviewing a 1997 doctor's report that limited Green
168. Id. at 2669.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 150-151.
170. Michaels, supra note 79, at 2676.
171. 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 254 (Ct. App. 2005). This case is currently pending
review by the California Supreme Court.
172. Id. at 257.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 258.
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to light work, Green's employer decided that he was incapable of
performing his duties.' 76 Green was ultimately placed on disability
leave. 177  Green filed a claim under FEHA, alleging disability
discrimination and failure to accommodate. 178 The jury returned a
verdict in his favor, awarding him nearly $600,000 in economic
damages and $2,000,000 in non-economic damages. 
179
On appeal, the court considered the following question
regarding the first step of the McDonnell-Douglas test: "Does
plaintiff have to prove he has the capacity to perform his essential
duties as an element of his prima facie case or does [the] defendant
have to establish that plaintiff cannot perform his duties with
reasonable accommodation?"'' 80  After examining the language of
FEHA and administrative regulations, the court concluded the
employer has the burden of proving the employee's incapacity to
perform the job: "The prima facie case for disability discrimination
under [FEHA] ... does not require plaintiff to prove that he is a
qualified individual. Rather, the burden is on defendant to establish
that plaintiff is incapable of performing his essential duties with
reasonable accommodation."'
' 8 1
Although Green does not directly address the "honest belief'
standard, it does at least implicitly require more of employers than a
simple "honest belief." Under Green, the burden is on the employer
to prove that the employee was incapable of performing her job
functions. 182 It is not sufficient for the employer to claim that he or
she "honestly believed" the employee's disability prevented her from
performing her job. In fact, in some ways, the Green holding seems
to actually exceed the "honest belief plus." Under Green, an
employer must show that the employee could not perform her job
functions, whereas under "honest belief plus" the employer must
only show that he or she relied on a set of facts that led to this
176. Id.
177. Id. Green initially elected to be on disability leave, but later requested
to return to work-a request which his employer denied. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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conclusion. 
83
Thus, should the holding in Green survive review by the
California Supreme Court, the case certainly would provide
precedential support for applying the "honest belief plus" standard in
the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
In jurisdictions that choose to follow the Seventh Circuit's "pure
honest belief' standard, victims of employment discrimination
currently face an unreasonably difficult battle. They must not only
prove an employer's intent to discriminate, but must also show that
the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were not
honestly held. California courts should balance the scales between
plaintiff-employee and defendant-employer by rejecting this
requirement and instead adopting "honest belief plus." As discussed
above, this standard is both fairer to plaintiffs and truer to Supreme
Court precedent and the underlying goals of anti-discrimination
statutes.
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